安瓦尔·谢克,伊莎贝拉·韦一,戴霖杉,梁俊尚

• 1:美国社会研究新学院经济系
• 2:美国马萨诸塞州立大学阿姆赫斯特分校经济系
• 3:清华大学社会科学学院经济学研究所
• 4:马萨诸塞州立大学阿姆赫斯特分校经济系

摘要(Abstract)：

中美贸易失衡通常被认为由中国操纵人民币汇率所致。其实,关于人民币汇率失调的问题,众多经验研究并未达成共识。共识的缺失并非由量度不精而致,实因汇率操纵论的理论基础存在严重问题。传统的比较成本理论宣称,实际汇率会经自动调整实现国际贸易平衡;持续性贸易失衡因而往往被视为以外汇干预为手段进行汇率操纵的结果。与该理论形成鲜明对比的是,绝对成本理论将贸易失衡看作具有不同实际生产成本的国家之间自由贸易的结果,中美贸易失衡的根本原因正是源于两国实际生产成本的不同。

关键词(KeyWords)： 中美贸易失衡;自由贸易理论;汇率操纵论;比较成本理论;绝对成本理论

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 安瓦尔·谢克,伊莎贝拉·韦一,戴霖杉,梁俊尚

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• (1)参见Smith (1904)和Harrod (1957)。凯恩斯也拒绝比较成本理论，详见Milberg (1994,2002)和Mohiuddin (2017)。
• (1)该主张正是克鲁格曼和奥伯斯特菲尔德等主流经济学家一直批判的所谓“神论”(myth)，因为他们坚定信奉比较成本理论。参见Krugman和Obstfeld (1994)。
• (2)马克思在《资本论》第三卷中阐释了这一观点(人民出版社，2004，第625页):“如果金被输出，那么，按照这个通货理论，输入金的国家的商品价格就必然会提高，从而在金输入国的市场上，金输入国的出口品价值将降低……事实上，金量的减少只会提高利息率，而金量的增加则降低利息率。如果不是因为在成本价格的确定上或需求和供给的决定上，要考虑到利息率的这种变动，商品的价格是完全不会受这种变动影响的。”
• (3)为了解释的方便，我们舍象对固定资本的考虑。
• (1)参见Shaikh(2016)中的第508~516页、第528~532页和图1. 4~图11. 7。
• (1)中国制造业工人平均工资为3. 6美元每小时，而美国制造业工人的平均时薪却达26美元(Mohiuddin,2017;U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,2019)。同一时期美国的生活成本大概是中国的1. 8倍(Numbeo. com)。
• (2)见Ceglowski和Golub(2012)。他们的发现不但与Ferguson和Schularick(2011)的发现一致，而且发现，中国的相对单位劳动成本比韩国、日本、墨西哥和欧盟都低。他们把单位劳动成本分解为实际工资和实际产出，这与我们先前的分析一致。他们采用生产者价格，但认为消费者价格更为合适。我们与其不同:他们假定PPP普遍成立，而我们主张PPP仅对可贸易商品成立，并考虑了巴拉萨—萨缪尔森效应。
• (1)例如，在2019年报告中，美国财政部呼吁中国进行“有效的结构性改革来减少政府在经济中发挥的作用”，并“允许市场力量发挥更大的作用”(U. S. Department of the Treasury,2019a,p. 23)。
• (1)该时段为主要考察阶段。
• (1)物价指数P*和P须衡量商品构成相同，且可贸易品与非贸易品比例相等的商品组合，见第一节的论述。
• (2)详见Shaikh(2016,pp. 517-527)。
• (1)最简单且备受争议的PPP方法当数《经济学人》杂志编制的巨无霸指数(Big Mac Index)，它试图用只含一种商品，即“巨无霸汉堡包”的指数来回避这个问题。参见Shaikh和Antonopoulos(2012)以及Shaikh(2016,pp. 528-535)。
• (2)参见Rogoff(1996)以及MacD onald和Ricci(2001)。实际汇率在短期内不是平稳的，参见Isard(1995,pp. 63-65)。尽管它在10~20年的期限内会返回到某个“目标值”，但这并不是PPP意义上的均衡汇率，参见Engel(2000,p. 21)。即便它返回某个非平稳的均值，其“收敛速度也极度缓慢”，参见Rogoff(1996)。详见Shaikh和Antonopoulus(2012)以及Shaikh(2016,pp. 522-527)。
• (3)参见Shaikh(2016,pp. 519,531)及其中图11. 6。
• (4)参见Ahmed(2009)、Borowski和Couharde(2003)、Chinn和Prasad(2003)、Cline(2007)、Cline和Williamson(2007,2010)、Dunaway和Leigh(2006)、Dunaway和Li(2005)。
• (1)参见Cline和Williamson(2007)。IMF在《CGER汇率评估方法》(2006)一文中，将类似的方法称作“简化型(reduced form)均衡实际汇率”，而Ahmed(2009)则把Cline和Williamson(2007)所称的BEER方法，归类为拓展版PPP方法。
• (1)不同研究表明，冲销“很难实行，有时候甚至会自行溃败”，“当资本具有充分流动性时，冲销操作……在资本持续流入的情况下，并不能长时间发挥作用”(Lee,1997)。
• (1)参见IMF数据库(https://data. imf. org/regular. aspx? key=61545855)。
• (1)应该指出，关于上述过剩储蓄的来源存在争议。Ferguson和Schularick(2011)指出，根据Kuijs(2005)和Wolf(2009)的研究，中国储蓄的增加来源于其私有企业和国有企业的留存收益，而非Bernanke所说的来自居民储蓄。这一发现与绝对成本理论完全一致。如果是中国的成本竞争力导致贸易顺差，那么可以预期企业储蓄将会增加。
• (2)这个假说与Bernanke(2005)所称的“美国制造”假说类似。