周建军

• 1:国务院国有资产监督管理委员会研究中心

摘要(Abstract)：

过去一百多年里,因应保护小生产者、消费者福利、国际竞争力、世界战争等国内国际因素,受哈佛学派、芝加哥学派等占主导地位的政治经济意识形态影响,美国的反垄断政策目标在不同的时期各有侧重。无论是主动的还是被动的,围绕并购重组的反垄断政策一直扮演着“胡萝卜加大棒”的角色,深刻地影响着美国的市场结构、企业行为与产业发展。从实际政策效果来看,无论是“胡萝卜”还是“大棒”政策,都未能切实阻止美国企业并购重组的总体趋势。尤其是,自20世纪70、80年代以来,无论是美国政府的反垄断指数的提高,还是生产、研发、营销和采购环节合作的许可,或是在特定领域的反垄断豁免,都使美国企业旨在实现规模经济与技术创新的并购重组在更大程度上成为可能,也引领和塑造了美国半导体、飞机制造业和微软公司被控垄断案的方向。在全球产业集中和竞争依然激烈的大背景下,后发国家如何在做好有效监管的同时通过并购重组培育本土大企业,美国这样的发达国家关于反垄断政策的经验和教训值得研究参考。

关键词(KeyWords)： 美国经济;反垄断;大企业;并购重组;规模经济;技术创新

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 周建军

参考文献(References)：

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• (1)2010年,《并购指南》被修订为《横向并购指南》。在2010年修订之前,《横向并购指南》一直被称为《并购指南》。
• (2)对于反垄断政策与产业政策、竞争政策的关系和分类,学术界看法不太一致。无论是谢泼德,还是“哈佛学派”代表人物弗里德里克·谢勒(Frederic M. Scherer,曾任美国联邦贸易委员会首席经济学家),都认为反垄断政策是美国产业政策的形式之一(谢泼德和谢泼德,[2003]2009,p. 394;谢勒,[1997]2010)。
• (1)从《谢尔曼法》通过到罗斯福新政前后的很长时间里,美国的反垄断案件有一些是针对工会的,对工人并不友好。
• (1)20世纪80年代,美国半导体产业遭遇了日本、韩国等国企业的激烈竞争,一度走上了下坡路。包括半导体产业在内的国际竞争加剧是美国反垄断政策变化的重要原因(周建军,2018)。
• (1)这方面的代表性研究包括Kolko(1967)、Bork(1978)、Fligstein(1990)、Peritz(2000)。
• (2)进一步地,着眼于私有资本主导的产业并购可能带来的消极影响,美国总统西奥多·罗斯福指出了大企业“社会化”(socialize big business)的必要性。转引自Scherer(1994, p. 20)。
• (1)英文原文:“Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an important role in a free enterprise economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets. While challenging competitively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that larger universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral.” See U. S. Department of Justice,1984 Merger Guidelines, available at http://www. justice. gov, 2015. 7. 31.
• (2)类似美国的《横向并购指南》,欧盟的《横向并购指南》也借鉴美国规定予以修订。在欧盟《横向并购指南》中,并购的“潜在效率”(potential effciencies)被予以考虑,作为并购是否被反对的重要考量。同时,2004年的新的并购监管规定就产业集中的反竞争影响评估作了修订,原有关于产业集中涉及“构成或加强(企业)支配地位”的表述被删除。这样来看,原有“没有严重阻碍在共同市场有效竞争、没有构成或(企业)支配地位的产业集中,将被视为与共同市场相容”的内容,已修订为“没有严重阻碍在共同市场有效竞争的产业集中,将被视为与共同市场相容。”这意味着,判定产业集中或并购是否与市场相容的标准已经趋同于美国的“可竞争理论”,而不再关注产业集中或并购是否构成“支配地位”(Calmfors,et al., 2006, p. 112)。
• (1)托马斯·麦克劳(Thomas K. Mc Craw)题为《政府、大企业和国民财富》的文章还认为:“在20世纪里,美国政府对企业发展的促进作用与其他国家不同。在美国,这种促进作用集中表现为诸如反垄断法和证券法之类的,间接地起着促进作用的一系列法律,还有就是以税收方面的优惠政策为切入点,大力鼓励航空、电子、化学这些新型产业的发展,以及通过积极的财政政策管理宏观需求。”(钱德勒,[2000]2004,pp. 550-552)
• (1)U. S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines,available at:http://www. justice. gov/atr/table-contents,2015. 7. 31.
• (1)英文原文:“By contrast, even a highly concentrated market can be very competitive if market shares fluctuate substantially over short periods of time in response to changes in competitive offerings. However, if competition by one of the merging firms has significantly contributed to these fluctuations, perhaps because it has acted as a maverick, the Agencies will consider whether the merger will enhance market power by combining that firm with one of its significant rivals.” U. S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at:http://www. justice. gov/atr/table-contents, 2015. 7. 31.
• (2)英文原文:“Whenevaluatingtheeffectsofamergeroninnovation,theAgenciesconsidertheabilityofthe merged firm to conduct research or development more effectively. Such efficiencies may spur innovation but not affect short-term pricing.” U. S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at:http://www. justice. gov/atr/table-contents, 2015. 7. 31.
• (3)20 世纪80年代以前,日本和欧盟对企业战略联盟和合作创新的态度比美国更宽松。日本人认为,联合研发活动是促进竞争的,因此不应该按照反垄断法起诉。在1968年,欧盟委员会制定了《企业间合作通知》(Notice of Cooperation between Enterprises),明确企业之间旨在进行研究开发的横向合作将不被纳入反垄断的范围(Jorde and Teece, 1990, pp. 87-89)。
• (1)U. S. Department of Justice, National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, available at http://www. justice. gov, 2015. 7. 31.
• (2)英文原文:“In order to compete in modern markets, competitors sometimes need to collaborate.Competitive forces are driving firms toward complex collaborations to achieve goals such as expanding into foreign markets, funding expensive innovation efforts, and lowering production and other costs.” U. S. Department of Justice,Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2015. 8. 1.
• (3)英文原文:“Such collaborations often are not only benign but procompetitive.” U. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2015. 8. 1.
• (4)英文原文:“Participants may combine complementary technologies, know-how, or other assets to enable the collaboration to produce a good more efficiently or to produce a good that no one participant alone could produce.” U. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2015. 8. 1.
• (5)英文原文:“Competitorcollaborationsmayinvolveagreementsjointlytosell,distribute,orpromotegoods or services that are either jointly or individually produced. Such agreements may be procompetitive, for example, where a combination of complementary assets enables products more quickly and efficiently to reach the marketplace.” U. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2015. 8. 1.
• (1)英文原文:Competitor collaborations may involve agreements jointly to purchase necessary inputs. Many such agreements do not raise antitrust concerns and indeed may be procompetitive. U. S. Department of Justice,“Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors”, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2000. 4. 7. U. S.Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc.gov, 2000. 4. 7.
• (2)英文原文:Through the combination of complementary assets, technology, or know-how, an R&D collaboration may enable participants more quickly or more efficiently to research and develop new or improved goods, services, or production processes. U. S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, available at http://www. ftc. gov, 2015. 8. 1.
• (1)从历史的角度,钱德勒认为,美国的反垄断立法与1914年成立的联邦贸易委员会一直在制止独占垄断并鼓励寡头垄断。具体而言,最高法院在对E. C.奈特案件、艾迪斯顿钢管和钢公司案件以及横贯密苏里运费案件的判决中,谴责了联盟,却宽恕了控股公司,这加速了合法的合并运动的来临。这些判决提供了促使家族公司联合以合并成一个单一的、合法企业的强大动力。乔治·斯蒂格勒也认为《谢尔曼法》是企业兼并目的由垄断变为寡头垄断的重要原因(钱德勒,[1977]1987;施蒂格勒,[1968]1989,p. 15)。
• (1)可汗明确提出:“如果我们认可占统治地位的在线平台企业是自然垄断或寡头垄断,对其采用公共事业体制或基础设施责任的相关条款,这样既可以保持企业规模带来的好处,又可以限制占支配地位的平台企业滥用市场力量的能力。”(Khan,[2017]2019)。
• (1)美国智库信息技术与创新基金会(Information Technology and Innovation Foundation,ITIF)负责人罗伯特·阿特金森(Robert D. Atkinson)和经济学家迈克尔·林德(Michael Lind),主张发展型政府和积极的产业政策,强调大企业作为关键的国家资源的重要性,建议在国际经济贸易中超越比较优势原则,自称是国家发展主义者(national developmentalists)(Atkinson and Lind, 2018)。
• (2)美国联邦贸易委员会主席可汗在批评平台企业的问题的同时,也不否认企业规模的重要性(Khan,[2017]2019)。
• (3)为应对私有资本主导的产业集中可能带来的各种消极影响,收益限制、价格管控、收益共享、所有权的公共化等都被多个国家不同程度地采用。世界银行前首席经济学家巴苏提出了企业的收益共享、私人持有的股权分散化等建议(巴苏,[2021]2021,pp. 94-97)。